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I am grateful to Howard Sankey for commenting on my paper, “You Can’t Handle the Truth: 
Knowledge = Epistemic Certainty,” in which I present an argument from the factivity of 
knowledge for the conclusion that knowledge is epistemic certainty.1 The argument runs as 
follows: 
 
(1) If S knows that p on the grounds that e, then p cannot be false given e. 
(2) If p cannot be false given e, then e makes p epistemically certain. 
(3) Therefore, if S knows that p on the grounds that e, then e makes p epistemically certain.2 
 
Sankey argues that it is the notion of grounds that is doing the work in this argument, not the 
notion of factivity.3 As Sankey puts it: 
 
the argument that Mizrahi presents does not in fact proceed from the factivity of 
knowledge to knowledge being epistemic certainty. Rather, the argument proceeds from 
an assumption about the relation between grounds and knowledge to the conclusion about 
epistemic certainty.4 
 
Sankey argues that this argument proceeds from an assumption about grounds, not factivity, 
because, to say that knowledge is factive is to say that “knowledge requires truth,”5 whereas “the 
claim that knowledge is factive says nothing about a relation between grounds and knowledge.”6 
 
Now, Sankey is right that, strictly speaking, factivity “says nothing about a relation between 
grounds and knowledge.”7 But the claim that knowledge is factive does say something about a 
relation between grounds and knowledge. For, just as “knowledge requires truth,”8 knowledge 
also requires justification. Just as it “is not possible to know a proposition if that proposition is 
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false,”9 it is also not possible to know a proposition if that proposition is unjustified. 
Accordingly, if S has no grounds for believing that p, then S cannot be said to know that p. On 
the other hand, if S knows that p, then p must be not only true but also justified. Therefore, the 
claim that knowledge is factive does say something about the relation between knowledge and 
grounds insofar as knowledge requires justification. And justification (i.e., reasons or evidence) 
is that which makes a proposition epistemically certain because, if S knows that p, then p cannot 
be false.10 
 
Nevertheless, I suspect that the argument sketched above can be made without the explicit 
mention of justification or evidence for p, given that knowledge requires justification in much 
the same way that knowledge requires truth. That is: 
 
(1) If S knows that p, then p cannot be false. 
(2) If p cannot be false, then p is epistemically certain. 
(3) Therefore, if S knows that p, then p is epistemically certain. 
 
I think that this argument works just as well as the previous one in showing that knowledge is 
epistemic certainty. Again, what guarantees the truth of p, i.e., what makes it such that p cannot 
be false, is S’s justification for p; justification that S must have if S can be said to know that p. 
Since p cannot be false because knowledge is factive, it follows that S’s justification for p must 
be such that it makes p epistemically certain. That is why knowledge = epistemic certainty. 
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